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Stu Woolman’s new book is an ambitious work, which expounds a theory 
of constitutionalism which breaks with traditional understandings of the self, 
the social and constitutional law, and seeks to reconceive them in a number of 
ways. This it does by drawing on a wide variety of scientific fields, theoretical 
endeavours, analogies and metaphors. To mention but a few examples: global 
neuronal workspace theory and experimental philosophy are enlisted to 
problematise and point beyond metaphysical conceptions of selfhood and 
individual freedom; the notions of feedback mechanisms, choice architecture 
and social capital are employed to rethink the social and the possibility of 
social change; and concepts such as shared constitutional interpretation and 
participatory bubbles are developed as a way out of the stale oppositions that 
tend to characterise constitutional thought. Throughout, the author takes great 
pains to relate these diverse concepts and theories to each other, and to weave 
the different strands into a coherent and defensible theory of constitutional 
adjudication.
The first part of the argument centres on a critique of the assumption 
that the individual self is unitary and coherent and shapes her own destiny 
in a conscious, rational manner. According to the author, this conception of 
the self is firmly entrenched in folk psychology and has roots in outmoded 
metaphysical understandings of volition and freedom. To this he juxtaposes 
the more constrained and fragmented understanding of the self that emerges 
from contemporary studies in disciplines ranging from neurological studies 
to social theory. These studies suggest that the individual possesses far less 
freedom than is commonly supposed, and that traditional notions of the self 
radically underestimate the extent to which the self is conditioned by cultural 
givens and social practices. However, these outmoded understandings are 
far from dead, and the author argues that their tenacious hold is visible in 
a number of judgments. For example, S v Jordan 2002 6 SA 642 (CC) is 
critiqued for its commitment to metaphysical notions of autonomy which 
preclude an understanding of the extent to which sex workers’ alternatives are 
dramatically restricted by a social context of poverty and exploitation. Prince 
v President, Cape Law Society 2002 2 SA 794 (CC) is similarly criticised for 
its overemphasis on the choice made by Rastafarians, and its disregard for the 
“arational, constitutive attachments that form the better part of our identity” 
(118).
Following from this critique, the author proposes a conception of human 
flourishing which, he argues, is central to the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”). Unlike metaphysical notions 
of freedom, this vision of flourishing attaches great importance to the 
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constitutive role of social attachments, roles and practices. It recognises that 
the institutions, routines and ties which allow humans to endow their world 
with meaning, can be uprooted only at great cost to individual and group 
flourishing. However, in addition to this conservative side, his theory of 
flourishing also has a more radical (or, in his words, a revolutionary) strand, 
which emphasises that a great number of South Africans find themselves 
excluded from the material and immaterial resources that are required to 
flourish, and requires that “issues of access, of coercion, of choice, of voice, 
of exit must be constantly negotiated – by the state and other actors – in order 
to ensure that all members of our society have a meaningful opportunity to 
flourish” (424).
This brings us to the second part of the argument, which concerns the 
social. If individuals are indeed more constrained than commonly supposed 
and if there is a “radical givenness” (a phrase he borrows from Walzer) to their 
social world, how is it that social change is possible? How can individuals and 
groups alter the ends that they pursue, and be responsive to challenges to the 
rules underpinning social practices? The author proposes a number of answers 
to these questions. For example, he argues that, just as individuals can change 
without having a fully conscious and rational self at the helm, social change 
is also not contingent on the existence of a central authority that deliberately 
adjusts a society’s ends and the means by which they are pursued. Similar to 
the way consciousness serves as a feedback mechanism that allows individuals 
to adapt their ends through trial and error, the “stores of collective wisdom 
about what works and what doesn’t work” (166) that underpin our social 
practices are subject to ongoing processes of verification and falsification. A 
commitment to social experimentation can enable societies to confront deeply 
held assumptions and cognitive biases, and the state and other social actors 
can nudge individuals and groups towards more optimal decision making by 
rearranging the contexts in which choices are made. A second explanation is 
that it is social heterogeneity that lies at the heart of the possibility of change. 
Again, there is a close affinity between the author’s take on the individual and 
social contexts. The heterogeneity of the roles each one of us performs often 
challenges us to reappraise our ends and adjust the means by which we pursue 
them. Similarly, the radical heterogeneity of the society we live in confronts 
us with the realisation that “there are other, perhaps better, ways of doing 
things” (175).
The theory of constitutionalism developed in this book is closely aligned 
to the author’s views on individual and collective selfhood. Not surprisingly, 
the notions of flourishing and experimentation again take centre stage. On the 
author’s reading, the Constitution is committed to the flourishing of everyone 
living in South Africa. In addition to rights of access to basic material 
resources, flourishing requires respect for those classical rights and freedoms 
which enable individuals to sustain the social practices and institutions which 
give their lives meaning. Importantly, it also requires the destabilisation of 
the very same practices and institutions, to the extent that they are grounded 
in rules of entrance, voice and exit which prevent the poor and marginalised 
from flourishing.
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The book advances an understanding of experimental constitutionalism 
which, it argues, is best equipped to promote individual and group 
flourishing, and to come to terms with the tension between the conservative 
and revolutionary strains of the Constitution. Experimental constitutionalism 
recognises that there is no single individual, body or functionary that can 
pronounce, once and forever, on the meaning of constitutional commitments 
and the best way of securing them. This follows, on the one hand, from the 
experimental epistemology that is at work here, which holds that it is only 
through multiple processes of trial and error that we are able to discover the 
best methods of attaining our ends (and also to revise those very ends). On 
the other hand, it follows from the fact of and commitment to heterogeneity. 
In a heterogeneous society, multiple constitutional visions exist alongside 
each other, which allow for different possible reconciliations of conflicting 
constitutional commitments. To close the door, once and for all, on contending 
constitutional visions is to undermine ways of life which are a source 
of individual and group flourishing, and to clamp down on processes of 
contestation and participation that are vital to the Constitution’s legitimacy.
Closely tied to this vision of experimental constitutionalism is the principle 
of shared constitutional interpretation, which recognises that constitutional 
interpretation is not the exclusive preserve of the judiciary, but is best seen 
as a joint venture involving all branches of government. The author argues 
that, even though courts have a fundamentally important role in expounding 
the meaning of the Constitution and setting general norms that should 
guide the actions of the coordinate branches, they need not have a theory of 
everything or give judgments that exhaust all possible constitutional readings. 
Constitutional learning is optimised where spaces exist for a variety of social 
actors to experiment with different ways of giving effect to constitutional 
norms, and where they can pool information and benefit from each other’s 
feedback. However, it is not only state institutions that can contribute to 
these ongoing processes of constitutional learning. The author coins the 
phrase “participatory bubbles” to capture the ways in which decision making 
can benefit from the participation of individuals and communities affected 
by laws or state policies. This idea is not grounded in idealised notions of 
democratic deliberation, or in the idea that extensive processes of deliberation 
and participation are needed to legitimate all exercises of state authority. 
Instead, the metaphor of bubbles highlights that processes of participation and 
interaction are spatially and temporally circumscribed: they normally deal 
with specific disputes and disperse (the bubble bursts) once the issue has been 
resolved. And yet, they can have a lasting impact, by leaving behind a residue 
of experience that feeds into our collective knowledge of best practices.
How does the theory of constitutionalism on offer envisage the division 
of work between judicial pronouncements on constitutional meaning and 
these broader processes of inter-institutional dialogue, information sharing 
and participation? The author’s views on this can be gleaned, inter alia, from 
his critique of judicial avoidance (in ch 1B), his discussion of rights analysis, 
limitations analysis and remedies (ch 5), his evaluation of constitutional 
experimentation in the contexts of housing and education rights (ch 6), and his 
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analysis and critique of twenty Constitutional Court judgments (ch 8). From 
these passages, it appears that his vision of experimental constitutionalism 
aims to provide an alternative both to judicial minimalism and Dworkinian 
maximalism. While favouring a rigorous form of rights analysis which 
articulates binding legal norms that can guide lower courts, state institutions 
and other social actors and facilitate rational decision making, he is nevertheless 
clear that these norms should be general enough to leave sufficient scope for 
a range of possible solutions to concrete cases. Accordingly, courts engaging 
in limitation analysis or deciding on remedies must adopt a flexible, reflexive 
approach. Mechanisms must be put in place to “gather relevant information, 
generate proposed reforms and relay feedback quickly” (264), and room must 
exist for the reconsideration of solutions previously arrived at in view of new 
empirical evidence.
This is an attractive vision, which anchors institutional matters of 
competence, cooperation and comity in the same values that, on his reading, 
inform substantive constitutional rights and principles. But while the 
experimentalism advocated here avoids the excesses of both a Herculean and 
an overly deferential approach, it is not free of tension, and I sometimes wished 
that the author would elaborate a bit more on the nature of these tensions and 
the best ways of negotiating them. For example, how exactly does the model 
of shared constitutional interpretation differ from a judicial philosophy of 
avoidance, given that it also requires judges to “consciously limit the reach 
of their holdings regarding the meaning of a given provision”, and “frees the 
court of the burden of having to provide a theory of everything” (425)? The 
author is clearly of the view that these two approaches rest on very different 
premises, and it would have added value if these differences were spelt out 
more.
A second and related set of questions concerns the relation between the 
general norms elucidated by the Constitutional Court and the various 
constitutional experiments occurring within that normative framework. The 
author welcomes the Court’s use of meaningful engagement orders in eviction 
cases as an example of an experimental approach which creates participatory 
bubbles through which information is shared and active citizenship is 
promoted. He nevertheless recognises that these orders could potentially 
detract from substantive judicial engagement with the right of access to 
housing (see for example 329-330). This, he insists, need not be the case – 
in his view, experimental constitutionalism is undermined, not bolstered, 
by a failure on the part of the courts to give normative content to rights. 
Judges must get the balance right: they must neither give too little normative 
guidance to the other actors engaged in processes of shared constitutional 
interpretation and participation, nor give judgments that leave them too 
little scope for experimentation. But this is a fine line which will be drawn 
differently in different contexts, and which raises difficult questions over the 
depth and breadth of judicial reasoning and the relationship between rights 
analysis, limitations analysis and decisions on remedies. For instance, why is 
it that experimentalism in the housing context would have been better served 
by stronger judicial pronouncements on the core content of the right (330), 
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while experimentalism in education has benefited from the Constitutional 
Court’s “quiescence on issues educational” (353)? Do some contexts lend 
themselves better than others to a non-interventionist stance on the part of the 
courts, or a tendency simply to decide the matter at hand, without formulating 
norms which extend significantly beyond the facts of the case? Could the 
political or cultural sensitivity of the issue to be decided or the singularity 
of the facts justify such a narrow approach? (Cf the discussion at 457 of 
Shilubana v Nwamitwa 2009 2 SA 66 (CC), a judgment which is lauded for 
the space it creates for communities to develop customary law in accordance 
with constitutional values, even though the author notes that the Court gives 
little normative guidance for the future resolution of conflicts between gender 
equality and cultural norms that reflect a patriarchal bias.) And to what extent 
is our understanding of the normative framework within which experimental 
constitutionalism occurs, itself subject to ongoing revision in view of new 
information and insights?
The book does not – and could not be expected to – answer these questions 
conclusively, but it provides an innovative conceptual and theoretical 
framework which could help free us from the stranglehold of unhelpful 
concepts and dichotomies, and which is sure to stimulate further reflection 
and debate. It is compulsory reading for anyone working in the fields of 
constitutional law and constitutional theory. Readers who are not comfortable 
with the underlying pragmatist philosophy, who are not convinced by the 
critique of traditional understandings of selfhood, or who do not share 
the author’s optimism about the possibility of law-grounded processes of 
experimental learning and progress, will nevertheless find much on these 
pages that is helpful and insightful.
The argument advanced in The Selfless Constitution is a complex one, and 
there were times that I wished that the author had introduced fewer theoretical 
perspectives, metaphors and examples. In the end, though, my irritation gave 
way to awe at the way in which he managed to pull the different strands of 
the argument – and the narrative – together. The book is written in an easy, 
engaging style, which helps to keep the reader interested.
The Selfless Constitution is a theoretically rich and imaginative work, which 
is set to become a standard reference. Although it deals, first and foremost, 
with South Africa’s Constitution, the significance of its theoretical reflections 
extends far beyond our national borders. It deserves to be read widely, and to 
become part of a transnational debate on the possibilities and limits of a form 




BOOK REVIEWS / BOEKRESENSIES 229
Stellenbosch_Law_Review_2014-1_Text.indd   229 2014/05/06   10:45 AM
